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Abstract
The recent interest in the sociology of violence has 
arisen at the same time that western societies are being 
urged to consider the profound social crisis provoked by 
global financial turmoil. Social changes demand the evo-
lution of sociological practices.
The analysis herein proposed, based on the studies 
of M. Wieviorka, La Violence (2005), and of R. Collins, 
Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (2008), concludes 
that violence is subject to sociological treatments cen-
tered on the aggressors, on the struggles for power and on 
male gender. There is a lack of connection between prac-
tical proposals for violence prevention and the sociol-
ogy of violence. It is accepted that violence as a subject 
of study has the potential, as well as the theoretical and 
social centrality, to promote the debate necessary to bring 
social theory up to date. This process is more likely to oc-
cur in periods of social transformation, when sociology 
is open to considering subjects that are still taboo in its 
study of violence, such as the female gender and the state.
The rise of the sociology of violence confronts us with 
a dilemma. We can either collaborate with the construc-
tion of a sub discipline that reproduces the limitations 
and taboos of current social theory, or we can use the fact 
that violence has become a “hot topic” as an opportunity 
to open sociology to themes that are taboo in social the-
ory (such as the vital and harmonious character of the 
biological aspects of social mechanisms or the normative 
aspects of social settings).
Keywords: Social theory, Violence, Women’s move-
ments, Taboo, Society, State.
Resumen
El interés reciente en la sociología de la violencia ha 
surgido al mismo tiempo que las sociedades occidenta-
les están requiriendo considerar la profunda crisis social 
provocada por la agitación financiera global. Los cambios 
sociales demandan la evolución de las prácticas socioló-
gicas. El análisis aquí expuesto, basado en los estudios 
de M. Wieviorka, La Violence (2005), and of R. Collins, 
Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (2008), concluye 
que la violencia es objeto de tratamientos sociológicos 
centrados en los agresores, en las luchas por el poder y en 
el género masculino. Hay una falta de conexión entre las 
propuestas prácticas para la prevención de la violencia y 
la sociología de la violencia. Es aceptado que la violencia 
como objeto de estudio, tiene el potencial, además de la 
centralidad teórica y social, para actualizar la teoría so-
cial. Este proceso ocurre más comúnmente en períodos 
de transformación social, cuando la sociología está abier-
ta a considerar objetos de estudio que aún son tabúes en 
su estudio de la violencia, tales como el género femenino 
y el Estado.
El ascenso de la teoría de la violencia nos confronta 
con un dilema. Tenemos la posibilidad de colaborar con 
la construcción de una subdisciplina que reproduce las 
limitaciones y los tabúes de la actual teoría social, o po-
demos usar el hecho de que la violencia se ha convertido 
en un “tema candente” como una oportunidad de abrir 
la sociología a temas que son tabúes en la teoría social 
(tales como el vital y armonioso carácter de los aspectos 
biológicos de los mecanismos sociales o los aspectos nor-
mativos de los escenarios sociales.
Palabras clave: Teoría social, Violencia, Movimien-
tos feministas, Tabú, Sociedad, Estado.
Cómo referenciar este artículo: AUTOR (2014). Violence in society. Pensamiento Americano, 7(13), 144-162.
Violence in society*
Violencia y Sociedad
António Pedro de Andrade Dores**
Universidad ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Portugal
Recibido: 24 de julio de 2014 • Aceptado: 20 de septiembre de 2014
* Este artículo es publicado como resultado de una investigación titulada: Sociologia da Violência.
** Profesor del Instituto Universitario de Lisboa, Portugal (ISCTE-IUL). Doctor en Sociología. Investigador del Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios en Sociología, CIES/ISCTE.
Pensamiento Americano Vol. 7 - No. 13 • Julio-Diciembre 2014 • Corporación Universitaria Americana • Barranquilla, Colombia • ISSN: 2027-2448 • pp. 144-163
http://coruniamericana.edu.co/publicaciones/ojs/index.php/pensamientoamericano
145
In the past few decades the study of vio-
lence as a social phenomenon has become 
taboo (Wieviorka, 2005, pp. 68, 143). Getting 
back to its study requires grappling with the 
reasons for that marginalization. This paper 
will pursue the idea that, rather than violence 
not being an integral aspect of what is society, 
it is the concept of society that we have become 
accustomed to that is incomplete and obscures 
violence in society.
The idea of society –here intended as West-
ern society– is a moral reference point and 
legitimizing concept. This legitimization has 
been weakened both at the level of sovereign-
ty and of democratic expectations. At the root 
of this weakening lies, at one end, the creation 
of regional super bureaucracies (e.g. Europe-
an Union), and at the other the fragmentation 
and isolation of communities, be it by actual 
physical barriers (e.g. gated communities), or 
by political labels (e.g. problem areas). At the 
same time, the idea of violence, previously as-
sociated with emancipation and progress –in 
that it legitimized nationalisms, the weapons 
race, the colonial liberation struggles, and the 
revolutionary experiences in various parts of 
the world, such as the USSR, Cuba and China– 
now suggests more a scenario of social and en-
vironmental decay, frightening and hopeless: 
the so often cited risk society of Ulrich Beck 
(1992). Various social currents offer innovative 
answers to these problems, such as permacul-
ture, rights of nature, transformative justice 
and unconditional basic income for example. 
From where will hope and confidence come in 
the society in flux (Reemtsma, 2011)?
Studying violence in society
Defining what is meant by “violence” in 
society is as difficult as pinning down exactly 
what we mean by “society”. Each time we ob-
serve and study violence in society it will be 
necessary to explain what society we are look-
ing at-i.e. what concept of society is being ap-
plied.
Michel Wieviorka refers to the decline of 
the classical intellectual, politically involved, 
bearer of paradigm shifting revolutionary 
proposals: “There haven’t been any important 
thinkers, in the social sciences and in politi-
cal philosophy, who haven’t, in a way or other, 
expressed a view about violence (…)” (Wiev-
iorka, 2005, p. 143). According to the author 
violence as a subject of study became taboo 
once more since the 1980s (Wieviorka, 2005, 
p. 68). As Hirschman (1997) also argues, re-
ferring to the transition from the eighteenth 
to the nineteenth century, the bourgeois cri-
tique of the use of violence by the aristocracy 
became taboo once the bourgeoisie achieved 
political dominance (see also Reemtsma, 2011, 
pp. 206-226). Similarly, over the last decades, 
the reaffirmation of capitalism in the era of 
globalization seems to have split into different 
emotional camps what people consider as good 
violence – generally with institutional or dom-
inant class origins – and as bad violence, that 
which deserves to be called violence – gener-
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ally originating among less privileged classes. 
This ideological regime hides, as well as avoids 
the debate about violence in society, making a 
clear definition of what constitutes it impossi-
ble. 
The discussion about what constitutes soci-
ety is no less complex, temperamental and con-
ditioned by the successive historical eras than 
the discussion of violence. Sociologists’ attacks 
on Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalism –
the most successful attempt at giving theoreti-
cal consistency to a definition of society– come 
to coincide with the neoliberal politics marked 
by Mrs. Thatcher’s murderous phrase, “There is 
no such thing as society”, descriptor of a whole 
political program bent on discrediting and de-
stroying the social forces that have engaged 
with social issues since the nineteenth century 
(Castel, 1998).
Michel Burawoy (2004) reclaimed Marxism 
as an epistemic platform from which to estab-
lish a definition of society that can be adapted to 
the current historical circumstances. He based 
himself on the ideas of Gramsci and Polanyi 
–two neo-Marxist authors with very different 
but consistent perspectives– to propose a new 
sociological framework: “Public Sociology”. In 
short, Burawoy’s thesis is that, as it happened 
after the 1929 crisis, sociologists must know 
how to make themselves heard alongside econ-
omists, political pundits, and the voices of the 
markets and the state.
Burawoy (2004) makes a commendable and 
rare effort towards defining what can or should 
be understood as “society”, in its various di-
mensions, in sociology. Citing him, even if at 
length, is useful:
[Parsonsian sociology] concentrated 
on “society” as an autonomous, all-em-
bracing, homeostatic self-equilibrating 
system, whereas Soviet Marxism left 
no space for “society” in its theoretical 
scheme of base and superstructure (op.
cit., 195).
In Marxist hands society is not a general 
notion that applies transhistorically to 
ancient and medieval worlds, tribal and 
complex systems, traditional and mo-
dern orders, embracing all the separate 
and functionally independent institu-
tions that together form a coherent and 
bounded whole. Rather, Gramsci and 
Polanyi endow their notions of society 
with historical specificity (op. cit., 198).
For Gramsci, society is civil society, 
which is always understood in its con-
tradictory connection to the state. Ci-
vil society refers to the growth of trade 
unions, political parties, mass education, 
and other voluntary associations and in-
terest groups, all of which proliferated in 
Europe and the United States toward the 
end of the nineteenth century (op. cit., 
198).
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For Polanyi society is what I call active 
society, which is always understood in 
its contradictory tension with the mar-
ket (op. cit., 198).
Polanyi often refers to society as having 
a reality of its own, acting on its own be-
half, whereas Gramsci understands civil 
society as a terrain of struggle. For both, 
however, “society” occupies a specific 
institutional space within capitalism be-
tween economy and the state, but where 
“civil society” spills into the state, “active 
society” interpenetrates the market. For 
both, socialism is the subordination of 
market and state to the self-regulating 
society, what Gramsci calls the regulated 
society (op.cit:198).
The author continues a sociological tenden-
cy, developed since the 1980s, of reconciling 
two contradictory epistemologies: the Marxist, 
centered on material production and the prin-
cipal social struggles (around the economy 
and technology), and the Weberian, centered 
on symbolic distribution, the markets and the 
possible harmonization of opposing interests 
arising from the erratic history of subjectivities 
(Weber, 2005; Touraine, 1984).
This reconciliation occurs at the same time 
that the thematization of violence becomes 
taboo, as noted by Wieviorka, and the fights 
between the superpowers as well as between 
the predominant social classes (the industrial 
workers and bosses) in Europe are appeased by 
the politics of the social welfare state. Such pol-
itics were built on the nuclear threat of the Cold 
War and policies aimed at social wellbeing. 
Social democracy becomes a global political 
reference; sociology flourishes professionally, 
serving that political project. A new problem 
presents itself when social democracy reveals 
itself impotent in the face of a world controlled 
by a single superpower.
The notion (suggested by Max Weber and 
worked by Parsons) that society can be differ-
entiated into dimensions of politics, economy, 
social status and culture, each to be given in-
dividual attention by the social sciences, has 
become, over the last few decades, a centripetal 
process of hyper-specialization into sub-dis-
ciplines (Lahire, 2012, pp. 347-351). Intra 
and interdisciplinary collaborations became a 
stated but almost always frustrated objective. 
Global discussions about what society might 
be have become rare and strangely irrelevant 
among sociologists.
The 1960s and 70 saw the development of 
new social movements: non-labor movements, 
with no institutional representation, but pro-
posing alternative lifestyles, communitarian, 
solidary, liberal, profoundly cognitive and crit-
ical, drawing similarities with what the labor 
movement had done in the nineteenth century, 
under very different circumstances and condi-
tions. These movements became radical cul-
tural and intellectual references for resistance 
António Pedro de Andrade Dores
Pensamiento Americano Vol. 7 - No. 13 • Julio-Diciembre 2014 • Corporación Universitaria Americana • Barranquilla, Colombia • ISSN: 2027-2448 • pp. 144-163
http://coruniamericana.edu.co/publicaciones/ojs/index.php/pensamientoamericano
148
to, and against the legitimization of the neo-
liberal inspired powers of the 1980s (Sennett, 
2006, confesses in the first page of the intro-
duction, that, in the 70, outside of America, the 
new left imagined that the debureaucratization 
would cause communities to emerge; instead, 
Sennett now recognizes, what emerged was an 
individualizing fragmentation and less free-
doms). Regularly predicted but not actually 
materializing resurgences of transformative 
social movements such as those of the 60 and 
70s, began to finally come to life in a variety 
of new forms in 2010: first in North Africa, 
then in Southern Europe, USA, Iran, Turkey, 
and Brazil. These modern social movements 
are characterized by the use of cyber networks 
and communication technologies (not avail-
able in the 70) and by an inherently anarchic 
organizational format (Castels, 2012). The so-
cial base of “students”, who were at the center of 
the revolutionary youth movement of the 60s 
and 70s, is now an expanded “new petty bour-
geoisie” (Poulantzas, 1978) with two or three 
generations of history behind it, but, due to an 
inhospitable employment landscape, presently 
with no prospects of a future. 
The perfecting of new technologies, the 
competition presented by emerging societ-
ies, the greed of the speculative production of 
profits, the capacity of advanced capitalism to 
recreate consumer societies in any part of the 
world, the necessity to reduce salaries in order 
to maintain the capitalist system of production 
in global competition, among other factors, 
play against the middle classes in the devel-
oped nations, a fact particularly evident in the 
politically peripheral territories of the West, 
also known as South of the North.
Resuming the study of violence
In breaking with the taboo of social studies 
about violence, what do Michel Wieviorka and 
Randall Collins tell us?
Michel Wieviorka’s, La violence (2005) is di-
vided in three parts. The first part describes the 
new paradigm of international and social rela-
tions that has been framing violence since the 
1980s. The second presents the different theo-
retical approaches to violence. The third part 
introduces a perspective on violence based on 
Touraine’s “subject” theory. By “subject” this 
theory means a constructed social entity, such 
as a person, a group, an institution, a social 
movement.
The author emphasizes the distinction be-
tween constructive violence and destructive, 
antisocial violence. The former is useful for the 
emergence of future societies. The latter is an-
tithetic to historical evolution.
In a typology with these two kinds of vio-
lence (of the “hyper-subjects” and “anti-sub-
jects”) at opposite ends, Wieviorka theorizes 
other agents of violence: a) that of the “floating 
subject” driven by a sense of injustice, b) that 
of the “non-subject” that acts mechanically, 
and c) that of the “survivor subject” that fights 
against its own social negation.
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The first part of the book presents argu-
ments in favor of the idea that historically there 
has been a reduction of opportunities to devel-
op conflicts. Conflicts which substituted and 
prevented violence as diplomacy can do with 
war. The past few decades have been character-
ized by: a) the development of two new spheres 
of the state: the “infra-sate” as a consequence of 
policies of privatization, and the “meta-state” 
as a consequence of the fight for access to pow-
er between religious and ideological groupings; 
b) an emphasis on victims’ rights; and c) glob-
al, instant media coverage and uncontrolled 
use of new media.
The second part of the book offers analyses 
of violence from three different perspectives: 
psycho-political, economics, and cultural. The 
violence of the masses and of social move-
ments, syndical violence, and violence due to 
lack of education, all have explanations distinct 
from cruelty, genocide and gratuitous violence. 
Sociology knows well the difference between 
“expressive” and “hot” violence (emotional), 
on the one side, and “instrumental” and “cold” 
violence (practical) on the other, but it does not 
deal with “senseless cold” violence (cruelty).
In order to include this hidden violence, 
cruelty, into analytical frameworks one needs, 
according to Wieviorka, to force the analysis to 
move beyond the social sphere. Subject theo-
ry does this by considering the subject as an 
historical agent, a protagonist for the purpose 
of constructing new types of societies, against 
the routines, traditions and logic of continuity. 
This way of thinking about violence, the author 
argues, allows for an analysis of cruelty.
This position raises problems: a) is it true 
that the collective consciousness and ideology 
indispensable to making sense of violence can 
only be studied outside of the framework of so-
cial theory? (Was it not Durkheim who defined 
sociology as the study of social morality, of the 
collective conscience?) b) Who is in a position 
to identify a constructive purpose for violence, 
in practical and intellectual terms? Should it be 
historians, politicians, psychologists, the state? 
And should they be contemporaries of the vio-
lence being studied or be sufficiently removed 
to be objective? 
Randall Collins, in Violence: A Micro-so-
ciological Theory (2008), defines violence as 
the act of physically assaulting another person. 
Collins studies violence, thus defined, looking 
to distance himself from moral questions. He 
provides answers for how we fight and for why 
we fight. Such answers are arrived at by reduc-
ing the analysis to patterns of interaction only. 
(Collins promises to look at violence from a 
macro perspective in a future work).
A constant in the 30 or so types of violence 
identified by Collins is “tension/fear” which, 
when it does not impede violent action, dis-
turbs it in such a way that being incompetent 
at it is very common. The emotional barrier 
constituted by tension or fear can be overcome 
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by a situation of social panic or moral holiday. 
In such instances, violence tends to be direct-
ed at weak or defenseless individuals (as in 
genocides or episodes of war). Caught up in 
these moral holidays, and the impunity that 
they bring, some actors can engage in violent 
action free of bad conscience or guilt. Mean-
while, the majority of those around them limit 
themselves to supporting the violence, spur-
ring it on and clamoring for its consummation, 
without themselves being able to overcome the 
“tension/fear” that stops them from engaging 
in direct violence. The first part of the book 
deals with the “dirty secrets” (worriers who re-
fuse to fight, panicking individuals who com-
mit acts of heroism, tough guys who seek out 
weak targets for their violence, etc.) of profes-
sional associations or other forms of grouping. 
The more “civilized” classes, as a means of so-
cial distinction, organize methods of moraliz-
ing the exercise of violence. They seek to con-
trol violence through rituals, rules, etiquette, 
clear separation between the agents of violence 
and the public, segregation by status, as in du-
els, entertainment and sports, for example (op. 
cit., 4-5). Ultimately, the consequences of vio-
lence depend more on the ability of one party 
to impose its emotional control than on their 
material and technical resources. Emotional 
energy defines the likelihood of engaging in vi-
olent action and of victory; it is reinforced by 
victory; goes into decline in defeat.
The dynamics of interaction are what trig-
ger violence (op. cit., 148). Collins cites coor-
dination through emotional resonance; attun-
ing with peaks (momentum/adrenaline); mind 
games for control of the limited social attention 
available; harmony v. opposition (emotional 
turning point), and collective effervescence, 
all as causes of violence. Therefore, physical 
violence is, above all, a mental question: “Vio-
lent interaction is all the more difficult because 
winning a fight depends on upsetting the ene-
my’s rhythms (…)” (op. cit., 80). “[Moral hol-
iday] is like an altered state of consciousness 
(…)” (op. cit., 100). This is not a problem which 
civilization tends to stamp out: “(…) violence 
is not primordial, and civilization does not 
tame it; the opposite is much near the truth” 
(op. cit., 29).
Collins’ explanation, centered on a morality 
particular to interactive contexts, is inconsis-
tent: he suggests that human nature is, above 
all, anti-violent, yet, at the same time, affirms 
that “Eradicating violence entirely is unrealis-
tic” (op. cit., 466). What might prevent a realis-
tic prospect of an end to violence? If he did not 
study the movements against violence, why did 
Collins draw the conclusion that eradicating it 
is “unrealistic”?
Theoretical limits of the sociology of vi-
olence
First, both Wieviorka and Collins study the 
perpetrators of violent actions and the social 
forces that support them in those actions, with-
out giving the same importance to the victims 
and to those who organize resistance to that 
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violence; therefore, they do not consider the 
acts of violence in their entirety. Is there not a 
pushing away of the more socially isolated, less 
visible victims in this theoretical blindness? Is 
this not a reinforcement of silencing the de-
feated? The ancestral culture of blaming the 
victims has permanent consequences which 
affect, above all, stigmatized social groups such 
as women. These groups are deprived of re-
sources with which to protect themselves and 
of an active voice (which sociology can help to 
actuate, if sociologists are willing to assume the 
costs of association with the defeated).
Second, the authors do not study institu-
tional violence, as if it were distinctive in nature 
from all other types of violence. ”The subject of 
this book is not state violence” says Wieviorka 
(2005:281), despite including an entire chapter 
on the subject (op. cit., 47-80). Collins, in turn, 
opted for starting his study of violence with a 
study of social interactions, telling us that civi-
lization –and the state– seems to have increased 
the likelihood of an individual experiencing vi-
olence. To know more we will have to wait for 
his macro-sociological analysis. Meanwhile, he 
recognizes that, in certain circumstances, the 
victims play an important role in the process of 
violence, when they attune with the aggressor 
in a subordinate manner (Collins, 2008, p. 8, 
26, 281; Dores, 2009, pp. 302-303). (As shown 
below, a better understanding of the implica-
tions of this failure to address institutional vi-
olence can be had by contrasting sociological 
theories to frameworks with liberating and 
emancipatory aspirations in the fight against 
violence (Wolfe, Wekerle and Scott, 1997; 
AAVV, 2013).)
Third, as it happens with sociology in gen-
eral (Therborn, 2006a:3), the authors do not 
give much attention to the vital nor existential 
dimensions of individuals, groups and societ-
ies. Wieviorka and Collins concentrate their 
attention on power relations, which are often 
violent. Paradoxically, they exclude the State 
from the power equation. Excluded is also any 
consideration of historical power relations and 
of non-modern societies. (Wieviorka is explicit 
in this respect, in using the first chapter to sit-
uate the type of violence he wants to address: 
the violence specific to the era that starts in the 
1980s) To Wieviorka the power that matters is 
that which is constituted into Touraine’s sub-
ject; to Collins it is the power of overcoming 
the emotional barrier of “tension/fear” con-
nected to potential violence. With this, prob-
ably unconsciously, they naturalize the social 
differences between the most powerful social 
entities, those in a position to constitute them-
selves as historical actors, those who may be ca-
pable to accumulate sufficient emotional ener-
gy to be agents/authors of violent acts, and the 
less powerful social entities. Social differences 
fixed as if cultural heritage, competencies, ca-
pabilities and dispositions were not a social 
constructs resulting from the conditions of 
birth, life experiences and social circumstanc-
es of each individual; neutralized as if each one 
were not required to conform to social roles 
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of gender, ethnicity, class, nationality. Pre-es-
tablished roles through which are produced 
expectations of behavior in violent situations, 
against which the person is measured as a man 
or a woman, as strong and courageous or weak 
and cowardly, as one who credibly threatens 
retaliation or one who cannot do it.
Fourth, in spite of recognizing the extreme 
variety of violent phenomena and their impor-
tance, as well as the absence of a sociological 
debate proportionate to these factors, neither 
of the authors preoccupies himself with under-
standing and explaining the collaboration of 
social theory with the construction of “social 
secrets” (see Dores and Preto, 2013:116-121), 
in this case, the taboo hanging over violence. 
Wieviorka affirms the necessity to come out 
of the restricted field of social theory, to the 
historical and psychosocial “difficulties of con-
structing the self as subject” (2005:67), in or-
der to undertake a (normative) study of and 
intervention on the subject (which can be ei-
ther individual, collective, communitarian or 
social). That is to say, “exploring the processes 
and mechanisms whereby the subject of vio-
lence, be it individual or collective, is formed 
and acts; considering it as subject, even if vir-
tual, in order to understand as much as one can 
the work that such a subject does on itself (…)” 
(Wieviorka, 2005:218). In turn, Collins’ pro-
posal is hyper specialized in interactive pro-
cesses, without considering the symbolic part 
of violence and with less attention to the social 
contexts than to the interaction between the 
protagonists (Collins, 2008:20). Based on their 
inquiries, both authors recommend particular 
forms of social control to be employed by the 
state against violence (Wieviorka, 2005:314-5; 
Collins, 2008:21), having excluded institution-
al violence from their observational horizons.
Fifth, for both authors, each in its own way, 
violence is not natural in society. For Wievior-
ka, society results, at each moment, from the 
actions of the subjects (historical actors) and 
is destroyed by the violence of the anti-sub-
jects: “the notion of the subject includes or, 
at the very least, implies its opposite, (…) the 
anti-subject (…)” (Wieviorka, 2005:287). Al-
though there is to take into consideration, as 
the author does in his typology (ibid: 293-301), 
the intermediate subject types. In his view there 
are two types of socially regulated conflicts: 
the constructive violence of new, progressive 
social relations, and merely destructive, an-
tisocial violence. For Collins, the core of the 
interpretation of violence is the negation of its 
being natural. His principal conclusion is that 
violence is not easy; it results from an uncom-
mon, not spontaneous effort: “Not violent in-
dividuals, but violent situations (…) situations 
which shape the emotions and acts of individu-
als who step inside them” (Collins 2008:1). An 
individual’s natural and spontaneous tendency 
is to avoid violence, not to provoke it. What is 
artificial is the construction of circumstances 
which entail the violent action of individuals: 
“(…) most of the time quarrelling is normal, 
regularized, limited. (…) what are the special 
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circumstances that take some of them over the 
ultimate limit into actual violence?” (Collins 
2008:338). Wieviorka sees modes of “organiz-
ing” conflict as the way to maintain the soli-
darity indispensable to the endurance of a soci-
ety. Collins sees the costs of releasing violence, 
the costs of overcoming the tension/fear that 
the prospect of violence elicits in each human 
being, as being the greatest potential source of 
violence control. They are divided by human 
nature’s dilemma which perennially opposes 
Hobbes to Rousseau.
So different from each other, what do the 
approaches to violence by Collins and Wiev-
iorka have in common? The analysis shows, 
a) the difficulty in finding a consensus among 
sociologists as to a definition of “society”; b) a 
synthesis of the work of both sociologists on 
the state of the sociology of violence; c) an 
evaluation of the limitations common to both 
approaches; d) the distance between proposals 
for violence prevention and sociological theo-
ries; e) the profound relationship between vio-
lence and collective consciousness; f) the ob-
stacles that inhibit current social theories; and 
g) the potential of the sociology of violence to 
serve as catalyst for updating the whole of so-
cial theory.
The prevention of violence
Organizing violence prevention without an 
in depth discussion of the roles of gender and 
state security forces in the construction of vio-
lence is impracticable.
The issue of violence provokes strong emo-
tions (taboos, fears, mystifications, accumula-
tions of emotional energy, traumas) associated 
with processes of personal and social trans-
formation. Social theory does not marshal 
the conditions to treat this issue in a scientific 
manner. Among the reasons for this is its dif-
ficulty in establishing some type of reasonably 
complete object of study, as seen above. Anoth-
er problem is the difficulty social theory has in 
exposing how violence is used by patriarchal 
and state powers. 
In matters of violence, women tend to be 
victims. They have, however, been protago-
nists of unique social transformations (Ther-
born, 2006b), a definitive force in modern civ-
ilization. Therefore, the in-depth study of the 
women’s movement is fundamental not only to 
understanding the legacy of Western moderni-
ty to humanity, but also to how those who are 
most afflicted by the pains of violence may be 
a transformative force in the quest to compre-
hend and move toward the prevention of vio-
lence.
More so than others, the women’s is a social 
movement centered on what Therborn saw as 
“three fundamental dimensions of inequali-
ty, vital, existential, and resources inequality” 
(2006a:3). Central to the processes of physical 
and mental reproduction of people and soci-
eties, the women represented in this move-
ment include innumerable victims of local and 
global, family and institutional violence. This 
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is a perspective that could inspire new socio-
logical approaches to violence, perhaps capa-
ble of placing the ideas of society, women and 
violence, at the top of agendas, including those 
of social theory.
The American family and the Ameri-
can home are perhaps as or more violent 
than any other single American institu-
tion or setting (with the exception of the 
military, and only in time of war). [Ad-
ding, based on official statistics:] Ame-
ricans run the greatest risk of physical 
injury in their own homes and by mem-
bers of their own families (M. Strauss, R. 
Gelles and S. Steinmetz, Behind Closed 
Doors — Violence in the American Fa-
mily, London, Sage Publications, 1988, 
p. 4).
Yet women have been left out of the terms 
of reference in dominant social theory, even 
where authors such as Giddens made an effort 
to give epistemological and analytical empha-
sis to the study and observation of violence in 
society (“There is a conspicuous absence (….): 
the feminists movements” Giddens, 1991:143). 
Burawoy (2004:249) notes how attacks on the 
politics of social wellbeing, via “re-privatiza-
tion”, validate the social conditions for wom-
en’s subordination to the demands of childcare 
and dependence on someone else (generally a 
man).
Both the potentials and problems described 
above became evident in any analysis of vio-
lence prevention work, for example: 
“The expression of violence is most com-
monly seen in the context of relations-
hips” (Wolfe, Wekerle and Scott, 1997: 
x). “Current policies to address personal 
violence are outdated and superficial (…) 
Violence does not affect everybody equa-
lly – it is ingrained in cultural expressions 
of power and inequality, and affects wo-
men, children, and minorities most signi-
ficantly” (ibid: xi, italics in original).
From this perspective we are immediate-
ly in another, very distinct world. We passed 
from the current public world – where, effec-
tively, violence is not easy, as Collins notes, and 
is above all a problem for the enforcement au-
thorities who must contain the aggressors, as 
Wieviorka points out – to a private world, in 
which the victims seem defenseless and with 
little possibility of recurring to the forces of 
order in any meaningful way. By comparison 
to social theory, the work of violence preven-
tion also has another ambition and depth: 
“Prevention of violence entails building on the 
positive (through empowerment) in the context 
of relationships, not just focusing on individual 
weakness or deviance. (…) Youth are important 
resources and are part of the solution” (Wolfe, 
Wekerle and Scott, 1997: xii, italics in origi-
nal). After all, aggressors and victims tend to 
know each other well, often being close family 
members. They are also both potential resourc-
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es for the prevention of violence, in different 
ways and capacities, obviously. It is not from 
the institutions, in practice little interested, or 
even complicit in the violence thus described, 
that innovations and more efficiency in this 
domain are likely to come. Despite it being 
from them that the specialists expect the en-
ergy for violence prevention to originate, in 
reality institutions generally serve to support 
the defensive strategies of specialists and insti-
tutions pressured by the status quo. The people 
who live the processes of socialization are the 
most interested in overcoming the situations of 
violence in which they are involved, they need 
but to feel free and supported to move in that 
direction.
By contrast to Wieviorka, who does not 
contest the popular conception of violence, 
those who work directly in the field of violence 
prevention do not share the common under-
standing of what constitutes it. Frequently, both 
aggressors and victims develop a sense of lack 
of any responsibility for the violence; a sense 
that is altered only in the face of an external 
authority, typically of the state. Further, victims 
often are participants of a game in which they 
recurrently assume a cooperative role with the 
violent, be it by assuming a position against the 
intervention and repression of the state by sid-
ing with the aggressor, or by demanding that 
the state impose a sentence on the aggressor 
(the collaboration being with state violence, in 
this case). (…) violence is any attempt to con-
trol or dominate another person (…) such as 
isolating one’s self or partner; limiting self or 
partner’s gender roles (…) as well as physical 
(…) and sexual abuse (…)” (Wolfe, Wekerle 
and Scott, 1997:9, italics in original). It is not 
only power and access to resources (reason, in-
terest, solidarity, identity) that cause violence. 
Even the least institutionalized levels of social 
life are densely permeated with violence. Both 
intimate relations and any of the phases of so-
cialization and personality development know 
violence, independently of power games. From 
the day-to-day emerge practices that either en-
able or disable violence, however manifested. 
This violence arises not only as aggression or 
defense, but also as forms of relating – as cases 
of domestic and institutional violence demon-
strate. 
For the victims it may be less dangerous to 
let the opponent in a violent dispute win than 
to instigate their hatred through the humilia-
tion of a defeat. It is also on this logic that the 
efficiency of repression is based. Therefore, to 
what point is the transformation of aggressors 
into victims of the state, or of the victims into 
avengers, efficient in the prevention of vio-
lence?
“Rather than focusing on efficiency, cost, 
safety, protection, or deviance, this perspec-
tive places a high emphasis on health promo-
tion and empowerment (…) the importance 
of attaining a balance between the abilities of 
the individual (or groups of individuals) and 
the challenges and risks of the environment” 
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(Wolfe, Wekerle and Scott, 1997:47). From this 
point of view, therefore, violence is not primar-
ily a struggle between parties. Rather, it is the 
socially labored choice to valorize the dispute 
between distinctive forms of identity construc-
tion, in the physical and political (or mental) 
senses.
Strategies with which to confront the con-
tradictions between social theory and the 
technicians of violence prevention, as well as 
the emerging problems of violence and how 
to avoid it fall into two main groups: violence 
or bargaining, war or diplomacy, force or cre-
ativity, imposition or liberation, conservatism 
or emancipation. The problem for civiliza-
tion, in the sense prescribed by Norbert Elias 
(1990) and further developed by Reemtsma 
(2011:408-415) is how to promote the second 
option and devalue the first. This is something 
that cannot be done through the criminal jus-
tice method, that is, by isolating a specific sit-
uation involving an individual accused of, and 
potential scapegoat for codified crimes, and 
ignoring all else: the victim and the social con-
ditions that establish the contexts conducive 
to the proliferation of violence in public, and 
especially in private spaces. This type of judi-
cial process makes the state protagonist of a 
considered, retaliatory violent solution to the 
violence allegedly perpetrated by the aggressor 
(not legitimized). In this way, the judicial, po-
lice and prison authorities have a monopoly on 
aggression, shielded by a repressive legitimacy, 
as noted by Max Weber. 
Reemtsma (2011:227-239) asks, how it is 
possible to maintain confidence in those in-
stitutions after such traumatizing historical 
experiences, especially those in the first half of 
the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. 
And how to deal with inexplicable, magnetic, 
exciting, contagious violence, as in moral holi-
days or riots? Will it be enough to develop our 
understanding of it to one day be possible to 
abolish violence, or will it always be necessary 
to employ violence to avoid violence as is done 
by the state?
Is violence natural?
Violence is not typical of male youths, Col-
lins notes. Violence is prevalent in domestic 
settings and mainly practiced by children, he 
writes. What happens is that force and the ca-
pacity for violence are among the few assets 
available to youths without status (Collins, 
2008:25-6). According to this author’s devel-
opmental psychology argument, genetic pre-
disposition, which attributes to young males 
greater likelihood of engaging in violence, 
overlooks situational contexts (Collins, ibid: 
25). “(…) foundations for (…) violence are or-
ganized in childhood but are often activated in 
adolescence (…)” (Wolfe, Wekerle and Scott, 
1997:74, italics in original). That is, in appro-
priate contexts, the bio-genetic potentialities 
are molded in each person and in each inter-
active group in function of values and past ex-
periences. Therefore, social contexts influence 
those potentialities, either by stimulating and 
affirming them or by negating them. For exam-
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ple, alienation and stigmatization can provoke 
aggressive behaviors.
“Youth must be supported with the informa-
tion and skills needed to be actively involved in 
working toward prosocial change in the youth 
subculture and in their broader environment” 
(Wolfe, Wekerle and Scott, 1997:64). In reality, 
not only the youths, but also children are edu-
cated to understand society as a source of op-
portunities or as a source of oppression. “(…) 
recent research suggests that abuse behavior is 
primarily learned through the same-sex par-
ent (…), identifying that males would be most 
detrimentally affected by being victimized by 
their father figure(s) and witnessing male as-
saults of their mothers” (Wolfe, Wekerle and 
Scott, 1997:109). Through their educators and 
the experiences they share with them, children 
learn what to see as benefits and drawbacks of 
violence.
If nature is understood as merely an indi-
vidual’s genetic predisposition, it is difficult to 
see how it would explain the common need to 
validate masculinity through violence. Cultur-
al traits explain a great deal of the violence in 
any society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009:132). 
Traits acquired not only through family and 
peers, but also through institutions, where it 
might be easier to ensure the transmission of 
values more conducive to violence prevention.
There are practices of social isolation, of 
violence, of incarceration, that are self-sus-
tained in the form of social syndromes, such 
as poverty traps (Torry, 2013:161-168), stigma-
tization (Goffman 2004:20-30), or the “revolv-
ing door” of prisons (Agency, n.d.). They are 
chains of social processes of mimetic aggres-
sion/victimization (Collins 2005), sustained 
by culturally constructed inequalities imposed 
through security institutions (law enforcement 
and social). The victims of these syndromes 
are produced from an early age and crave har-
monization – attuning – with those who might 
recognize and accept them in their tacit inferi-
ority. They may look to harmonize with chari-
table people and institutions, the social sector 
or the punitive state – there are even prisoners 
who refuse to leave prison and ask to stay after 
completing the sentence.
Social workers regularly refer to the ma-
nipulative character of those on assistance or 
incarcerated: they resist occupational and so-
cial integration programs offered by the insti-
tutions. This distrust of the people overseen by 
the state justifies the harshness of the correc-
tive approaches adopted by the professionals 
dealing with, and the entire social administra-
tion of the poor - for their own good, of course. 
However, in many cases, “nothing works” 
(Martinson, 1974)
Social syndromes are difficult to recognize 
by those involved. Even extremely qualified 
and distant observers can fail to recognize 
them. António José Saraiva (1994:211-292) 
points out that failing in the work of a French 
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historian who took the accounts of crimes in 
Inquisition records for credible descriptions 
of social life. Saraiva points out that the Court 
of the Holy Office was, among other things, a 
source of prestige and income for its officials 
and collaborators, to the point that they in-
vented crimes where there were none - using 
the famous torture techniques to obtain con-
fessions, as well as rewarding denunciation and 
prosecution witnesses. This means that the ac-
counts about the criminal events in the Inqui-
sition records should not be taken as actually 
reflecting facts. They might be examples of the 
social imagination of the era, produced for the 
purpose of domination, but cannot be reliable 
testimony of the social practices condemned 
by the tribunal. All the more so given that once 
the Inquisition was abolished and the acts un-
der its jurisdiction stopped being persecuted 
and criminalized, the formerly condemned 
practices were never heard of again. With the 
end of the prosecutions, the condemned Jew-
ish rituals were never again mentioned, prob-
ably for already not being practiced for many 
years prior.
Institutional autonomy is built on the pro-
cesses of resisting social interference with its 
own interests. What happens is a privatization, 
to a greater or lesser extent, of certain sectors 
(often transformed into labyrinthine struc-
tures, facilitating the defensive stance of the 
functionaries and, perhaps, rendering them 
more vulnerable to interests that come to con-
trol the directorship). But the whole of society 
is affected by the balance that each institution 
finds between the interests that colonize it and 
its function of representing social values.
With field work on violence prevention, 
“long-term follow-up (…) indicated that only 
the normative beliefs approach consistently 
predicts future drug and alcohol abuse. Nei-
ther resistance skills nor knowledge alone were 
significant predictors (…) of substance use” 
(Wolfe, Wekerle and Scott, 1997:125). There-
fore, education, that is, the example of signif-
icant people and institutions, is predictive of 
behavior. This imbues sociologists with a great 
responsibility, as they have a function in the 
field of violence prevention that they are not 
exercising.
Abolishing violence is unrealistic, because it 
is an integral part of life. However, the mobiliz-
ing and demobilizing of personal, institutional 
and social violence is a function of values, ed-
ucational methods, institutional involvements 
and particularly tense historical contexts in 
which fear either spreads or is defeated, as pro-
cesses of liberation and emancipation either do 
or do not take place.
What is going on with social theory?
This is the question, presented by Mouzelis 
(1995), who recognizes the distance between 
sociological thought and the realities to which 
it pertains. How is it possible to begin to theo-
rize violence starting from conceptualizations, 
such as those of Wieviorka or Collins, so dis-
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tant from the conceptualizations informing 
how the social services understand the vio-
lence they work to prevent?
To synthesize, Mouzelis identifies a conti-
nuity of the principal epistemological prob-
lems between the hegemonic phase of Par-
sons’ structural-functionalism and the current 
phase of post-modern challenge to that para-
digm: in spite of the general criticism of Tal-
cott Parsons’ contributions to social theory, the 
most referenced sociologists, Elias, Bourdieu, 
Giddens, says Mouzelis, were unable to over-
come the combination of reductionism and 
reification as an epistemological problem. To 
the identification of this problem are added the 
contributions of Lahire (2003, 2012), namely 
in denouncing the false oneness of people and 
the world preconceived by Bourdieu’s theories, 
as one of the most qualified representatives of 
contemporary social theory. Bourdieu’s theo-
retical “oneness” preconception arises primar-
ily as a consequence of an overvaluing of the 
dimensions of power (which in practice sub-
ordinate dimensions of gender, ethnicity, class, 
culture and age to power). This assessment is 
also made by Therborn in his study of social 
inequality (2006:3).
According to this diagnosis, social theory, 
although drawing from very diverse traditions, 
ended up closing in on itself. With the alien-
ation of the social sciences from other scienc-
es on one side, and the alienation between the 
social sciences themselves on the other, social 
theory is caught in a centripetal process of hy-
per-specialization around an object of study 
–society– the definition of which ends up, as 
seen above, not being quite clear.
Nevertheless, there are interesting and chal-
lenging proposals to deal with violence, to pre-
vent it, at the level of socialization and develop-
ment processes, as well as everyday life. Start-
ing from cases of child sexual abuse, an analysis 
by activists in the field set out a period of five 
generations to achieve the objective of prevent-
ing intimate, personal, family and community 
violence (AAVV, 2013). The authoring collec-
tive concluded that the principle obstacles to 
violence prevention are rooted and hidden in 
everyday, personal relationships. To attain suf-
ficient awareness of these obstacles to permit 
overcoming them is a long-term project. All 
the more so because the methods of state in-
tervention, in the context of social and crime 
policies, are not efficient and can be counter-
productive to the prevention of violence.
Elsewhere, starting from a reflection on the 
current socialization and development pro-
cesses, Acosta (2013) argues that those pro-
cesses are the cause of violence against the en-
vironment and populations. He calls our atten-
tion to the rights of nature: giving priority to 
harmonizing the interests of people, animals, 
plants and the environment rather than to the 
struggle for control over the exploitation of 
non-renewable (mineral, livestock, agricultur-
al, biodiversity and workforce) resources. To 
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Acosta, an economist, the centuries of struggle 
against colonial oppression by the indigenous 
people of the Andes to preserve a philosophy 
of life centered on harmony within society and 
with the planet, points out a possible path to-
wards a peaceful humanity (Santos, 2014).
All of which is to say: the seeds that may 
come to germinate in the turned soil of the 
current Western financial crisis (in the short 
term, but also by the civilizational crisis in the 
long term) were sown many years ago and face 
a long and laborious course of many decades 
or even centuries to bear fruit. How can a tem-
porally limited perspective (one would say re-
ductionist and reified) such as a social theory 
concentrated on the modern era, which at best 
reaches back to the origins of modernity (only 
200 years old), encompass the social nature of 
violence, both present and ancestral?
What the sociology of violence needs to 
do
As pointed out by Wieviorka (2005: 217-
221), the sociology of violence requires think-
ing outside of the safety boundaries sociology 
as set for itself. It is especially necessary to rec-
ognize the rootedness of human violence and 
modernity’s incapacity to contain it within 
satisfactory parameters. The growing repug-
nance towards violence (Elias, 1990) has not 
been enough to prevent it. For example, the 
increasing intolerance for gender violence has 
resulted in more prison sentences, but has not 
enabled us to satisfactorily prevent sexual or 
domestic violence.
Social theory’s centripetal strategy results 
in an academic space defended by increasing-
ly more specialized theories. Theories that are 
very detailed but more and more disconnected 
from each other, as well as from practical work, 
both professional and of activism. By contrast 
to theoretical work, in the practice of social in-
tervention, looking at real life situations, it is 
much more difficult to extract and separate so-
ciological/analytical dimensions.
All of sociology’s disciplines and sub-disci-
plines need to collaborate with each other and 
with professionals in the fields they address. 
The conditions for the social sciences to open 
up to each other must be pursued, developing a 
centrifugal epistemological process also capa-
ble of letting in other experiences and knowl-
edge – both scientific and normative (Santos, 
1989; Dores, 2013) 
In the short term, however, violence is not 
a minor question. Taboo that it is, it must be 
tackled if sociology is to understand what di-
rection societies, institutions and peoples are 
likely to take. Why did Bouthoul’s impressive 
sociological treatise on war (1991) not elicit 
engagement or further discussion? The lack 
of apparent impact of his proposals for the re-
form of social theory could be due to sociolo-
gy’s short-sighted perspective. As Hirschmann 
(1997) argues, sociology supports ideologically 
dated social and political interests that make 
violence a secret, masking the drives (e.g. 
greed, ambition) involved in allegedly rational 
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capitalist interests. Such a social theory is cen-
tered on a present which is isolated from the 
historical flux, and therefore reductionist and 
reifying. It is a social theory focused on ques-
tions of power yet neglecting the processes that 
sustain that power (at the vital and existential 
sociological levels). It is a pre-scientific theory, 
pre-paradigmatic and subordinate to conjec-
ture (Nunes, 1973).
In the long term, the five generations envis-
aged by Generation Five (AAVV, 2013) to es-
tablish practices for the prevention of violence 
is a period of time similar to the historical life 
of social theory. Such a timespan would allow 
for the establishment and development of a 
policy of openness to science, ideology and 
history within social theory.
Collins leaves many clues on how to be-
gin: “Humans have evolved to have particular 
high sensitivities to micro-interactional signals 
given off by other humans (…) to resonate 
emotions from one body to another in com-
mon rhythms” (Collins, 2008:26); “emotional 
dynamics at the center of a micro-situational 
theory of violence” (ibid:4). “Emotional energy 
(EE) is the variable outcome of all interactional 
situation” (ibid: 19). This means that, with or 
without violence, the emotional energies that 
evolve in the various social situations, can and 
should be studied. “Eradicating violence en-
tirely is unrealistic” (ibid: 466), because (even 
in its most direct and physical forms) it is nat-
ural to the human species, as made evident by 
observations of child behavior. Being natural 
is not the same thing as being commonplace, 
easy or spontaneous, for the simple reason that 
the human species is by nature highly depen-
dent on socialization and sociability, even (or 
especially) in violent contexts: “Violent inter-
action is all the more difficult because win-
ning a fight depends on upsetting the enemy´s 
rhythms (…)” (Collins, ibid: 80) “the basic ten-
sion can be called non-solidarity entrainment” 
(ibid: 82).
Identifying and overcoming the taboo that 
inhibits the development the sociology of vio-
lence is an ideological task. Its potential cog-
nitive value can open new opportunities to 
imagine a better way out of the civilizational 
crisis that we are living through. On the scien-
tific side, this requires the opening up, coop-
eration and convergence of the sociologies of 
the body, emotions, everyday life, institutions 
and globalization, free of subordination to the 
sociology of power. The questions of power 
(including abuses and perversities) should be 
given weight relative to its actual relevance in 
the formation and evolution of societies.
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